vulnerability_discovery_models
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vulnerability_discovery_models [2018/08/30 17:43] – Added description of the Delta-Bench paper ivan.pashchenko@unitn.it | vulnerability_discovery_models [2025/01/28 00:47] (current) – fabio.massacci@unitn.it | ||
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Among the [[research_activities|research topics]] | Among the [[research_activities|research topics]] | ||
+ | * Which vulnerable dependencies really matter? | ||
* How to (automatically) find vulnerabilities in the deployed versions of FOSS? | * How to (automatically) find vulnerabilities in the deployed versions of FOSS? | ||
* How to automatically test them (when you get a report) | * How to automatically test them (when you get a report) | ||
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Most importantly, | Most importantly, | ||
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+ | ===== Bringing order to the dependency hell: which vulnerable dependencies really matter ===== | ||
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+ | Vulnerable dependencies are a known problem in today’s open-source software ecosystems because FOSS libraries are highly interconnected and developers do not always update their dependencies. | ||
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+ | You may want to read first a thematic analysis study ({{: | ||
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+ | In {{: | ||
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+ | To achieve this, we carefully analysed the deployed dependencies, | ||
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+ | To understand the industrial impact, we considered the 200 most popular FOSS Java libraries used by SAP in its own software. Our analysis included 10905 distinct GAVs (group, artifact, version) in Maven when considering all the library versions. | ||
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+ | We found that about 20% of the dependencies affected by a known vulnerability are not deployed, and therefore, they do not represent a danger to the analyzed library because they cannot be exploited in practice. Developers of the analyzed libraries are able to fix (and actually responsible for) 82% of the deployed vulnerable dependencies. The vast majority (81%) of vulnerable dependencies may be fixed by simply updating to a new version, while 1% of the vulnerable dependencies in our sample are halted, and therefore, potentially require a costly mitigation strategy. | ||
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+ | Our methodology allows software development companies to receive actionable information about their library dependencies, | ||
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+ | Do you want to check if your project actually uses some vulnerable dependencies? | ||
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===== A Screening Test for Disclosed Vulnerabilities in FOSS Components ===== | ===== A Screening Test for Disclosed Vulnerabilities in FOSS Components ===== | ||
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If you are interested in getting the code for the analysis please let us know. | If you are interested in getting the code for the analysis please let us know. | ||
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+ | ===== Effort of security maintenance of FOSS components ===== | ||
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+ | In our paper we investigated publicly available factors (from number of active users to commits, from code size to usage of popular programming languages, etc.) to identify which ones impact three potential effort models: Centralized (the company checks each component and propagates changes to the product groups), Distributed (each product group is in charge of evaluating and fixing its consumed FOSS components), | ||
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+ | We use Grounded Theory to extract the factors from a six months study at the vendor and report the results on a sample of 152 FOSS components used by the vendor. | ||
===== Which static analyzer performs best on a particular FOSS project? ===== | ===== Which static analyzer performs best on a particular FOSS project? ===== |
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