



Complexity, Cryptography, and Financial Technologies

Lecture 3 – Cryptocurrency Examples Chan Nam Ngo

Examples of operational PTN

- **Ripple (<https://ripple.com>)**
 - Hybrid PTN
 - CAs for Value Creation
 - Brokers for Transaction Fulfillment
 - Supports multiple currencies
 - Including the native cryptocurrency XRP
 - History
 - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ripple_\(payment_protocol\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ripple_(payment_protocol))
- **ZeroCash (ZCash - <https://z.cash>)**
 - Decentralized PTN
 - Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency

Ripple Network Components

- **Gateways**

- Create “issuances” that represent transferable value
- Issuances are digital assets bound to gateways
 - Gateway A can create “USD.A” that corresponds to the USD currency that is issued by A

- **Brokers**


- Validate and fulfill transactions

- **Users**

- Out-of-band deposit the fiat money into the gateways in exchange for issuances
- Declare “trust-lines” to receive payments in issuances
 - “I accept at most 1000 USD.A”


Ripple Network Components - Gateways

- Gateway A issues 1000 USD.A and 1000 EUR.A
- Gateway B issues 2000 USD.B and 800 EUR.B




Ripple Network Components – Users and trust-lines

- User X accepts at most 300 USD.A
- User Y accepts at most 600 USD.A and 200 EUR.A




Ripple Network Components – Users and trust-lines (2)

- X has 200 USD.A, wants to pay 100 USD to Y
- X can just send 100 USD.A to Y




Ripple Network Components – Users and trust-lines (3)

- User V accepts at most 500 EUR.A and 500 EUR.B



Ripple Network Components – Users and trust-lines (3)

- Y has 100 EUR.A, wants to pay V 50 Euros
- Y can just send 50 EUR.A to V




Ripple Network Components – Users and trust-lines (4)

- **Y wants to pay U 50 Euros**
 - U doesn't accept USD.A or EUR.A
- **V must act as a “middle-man”**
 - Y sends 50 EUR.A to V
 - V sends 50 EUR.B to U

- **Further complications**

- <https://developers.ripple.com/paths.html>





Digital Signature for Authenticity

- **Key Generation**

- $(vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$

- vk is called the (public) verifying key
 - sk is called the (private) signing key

- **Signature Generation**

- $s \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m)$


- m is the message to be signed
 - s is the signature on m

- **Signature Verification**

- $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk, s, m)$

Payment Address from Verifying Key

- **address = AddressGen(vk)**
- **Requires SHA-256, RIPEMD160, and base58**



Source: <https://developers.ripple.com/accounts.html#address-encoding>

Distributed Ledger (DL)

- **Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant**
 - Technical details → Distributed Systems 2
 - We only use it as a black-box for now
- **DL is an ordered list that is**
 - Distributed – many nodes have the same copy
 - Append-Only – can only insert into the end of the list
 - No delete, no update
- **For simplicity we assume**
 - no conflict nor disagreement
 - no transaction fee for Brokers



Setup – DL and Keys

- **Brokers**

- Initialize an empty DL

- **Gateway G**

- $(vk_g, sk_g) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
- $\text{addr}_g = \text{AddressGen}(vk_g)$
- Broadcasts vk_g and addr_g

- **User U**

- $(vk_u, sk_u) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
- $\text{addr}_u = \text{AddressGen}(vk_u)$
- Receives then stores vk_g and addr_g

Setup – trust-lines

- **User U**
 - Creates a trust-line
 - $tl = (\text{addr}_u, \text{addr}_g, \text{limit}, \text{currency})$
 - $tls \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_u, tl)$
 - Sends tl and tls to Brokers
- **Brokers**
 - Receives tl and tls from U
 - $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_u, tls, tl)$
 - If $b = 1$, add tl into DL

Setup - deposit

- **User U**
 - Out-of-band deposits x USD (or another currency) into G
 - Sends $addr_u$ to G
- **Gateway G**
 - Receives $addr_u$ from U
 - Creates an “issued” transaction
 - $it = (addr_g, addr_u, x, \text{USD})$
 - $its \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, it)$
 - Sends it and its to Brokers
- **Brokers**
 - Receives its and it from G
 - $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_g, its, it)$
 - If $b = 1$, cont.
 - look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $l = (addr_u, addr_g, \text{limit} > x, \text{USD})$
 - if YES, add it into DL

Ripple Payment

- **Payee V**

- We assume V has done the Setup and added a trust-line on USD.G
- Sends $addr_v$ and amount p to U

- **Payer U**

- Receives $addr_v$ and amount p from V
- Creates a transaction
 - $t = (addr_u, addr_v, p, USD.G)$
- $ts \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, i)$
- Sends t and ts to Brokers

- **Brokers**

- Receives t and ts from U
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_u, ts, t)$
- If $b = 1$, cont.
- Look through the transaction history of U on DL to see if U has more than p USD.G
- look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $tl = (addr_v, addr_g, \text{limit} > p, USD.G)$
- if YES, add t into DL
- Any check fails, do nothing



Exercise time!!!

- Identify the steps that are relevant to the 4 high-level conceptual steps
- Identify the steps that mitigate the threats
- Let's go back and see the protocol again

Value Creation

- **User U**

- Out-of-band deposits x USD (or another currency) into G
- Sends $addr_u$ to G

- **Gateway G**

- Receives $addr_u$ from U
- Creates an “issued” transaction
 - $it = (addr_g, addr_u, x, \text{USD})$
- $its \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, it)$
- Sends it and its to Brokers

- **Brokers**

- Receives its and it from G
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_g, its, it)$
- If $b = 1$, cont.
- look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $l = (addr_u, addr_g, \text{limit} > x, \text{USD})$
- if YES, add it into DL

Payment Promise

• Payee V

- We assume V has done the Setup and added a trust-line on USD.G

- Sends addr_v and amount p to U

• Payer U

- Receives addr_v and amount p from V
- Creates a transaction
 - $t = (\text{addr}_u, \text{addr}_v, p, \text{USD.G})$
- $ts \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, i)$
- Sends t and ts to Brokers

• Brokers

- Receives t and ts from U
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_u, ts, t)$
- If $b = 1$, cont.
- Look through the transaction history of U on DL to see if U has more than p USD.G
- look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $tl = (\text{addr}_v, \text{addr}_g, \text{limit} > p, \text{USD.G})$
- if YES, add t into DL
- Any check fails, do nothing

Transaction Fulfillment

• Payee V

- We assume V has done the Setup and added a trust-line on USD.G
- Sends addr_v and amount p to U

• Payer U

- Receives addr_v and amount p from V
- Creates a transaction
 - $t = (\text{addr}_u, \text{addr}_v, p, \text{USD.G})$
- $ts \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, i)$
- Sends t and ts to Brokers

• Brokers

- Receives t and ts from U
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_u, ts, t)$
- If $b = 1$, cont.
- Look through the transaction history of U on DL to see if U has more than p USD.G
- look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $tl = (\text{addr}_v, \text{addr}_g, \text{limit} > p, \text{USD.G})$
- if YES, add t into DL
- Any check fails, do nothing

Recap: mapping Ripple protocol into High-level Steps

- **Creation of Value**

- Payer out-of-band deposits into Gateway
- Payer/Payee creates and sends a signed trust-line tl to Brokers
- Gateway creates and sends a signed issued transaction it to Brokers
- Brokers validate and accepts the signed trust-line from Payer/Payee and the signed issued transaction from Gateway

- **Promise of Payment**

- Payee sends payment address and amount to Payer
- Payer creates and sends a signed transaction t to Brokers

- **Fulfillment of Transactions**

- **Brokers validate the payment transactions**

- A payment transaction must be signed by the Payer and the DL history shows that the Payer owns more than the transacted amount
- Payee must have a trustline for the incoming issuances

- **then add them into DL**

- **Preservation of Value**

- **Gateway and Payer/Payee stores the keypairs and payment addresses**

- **Brokers store the trust-line history (in DL)**

- **Brokers store the transaction history (in DL)**

Over-drafting countermeasure

• Payee V

- We assume V has done the Setup and added a trust-line on USD.G
- Sends addr_v and amount p to U

• Payer U

- Receives addr_v and amount p from V
- Creates a transaction
 - $t = (\text{addr}_u, \text{addr}_v, p, \text{USD.G})$
- $ts \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_g, i)$
- Sends t and ts to Brokers

• Brokers

- Receives t and ts from U
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(vk_u, ts, t)$
- If $b = 1$, cont.
- Look through the transaction history of U on DL to see if U has more than p USD.G
- look into the DL to see if there is a trust-line $tl = (\text{addr}_v, \text{addr}_g, \text{limit} > p, \text{USD.G})$
- if YES, add t into DL
- Any check fails, do nothing

Countermeasures for Ripple Integrity

- **Over-Drafting**
 - Brokers look through the transaction history to determine current available fund and check against the transacted amount
 - Brokers look into the trust-line history to determine the current limit for incoming issuances
- **Double-Spending**
 - N/A
- **Unauthorized-Spending**
 - Brokers check the Payer signature when validating the transactions
- **Individual Loss**
 - N/A
- **Systemic Loss**
 - N/A

Confidentiality vs Anonymity

- **Involves answering three questions**
 - **Instantaneous Network**
 - At time t , can we identify the total value v of a nominal identity I ? **YES**
 - **Transient Value**
 - At time t , can we know about a transaction of value v between two nominal identities I_1 and I_2 ? **YES**
 - **Persistent Identity**
 - Can we link two nominal identities I_1 at time t and I_2 at time t' ? **YES**
- **There is no Confidentiality nor Anonymity in Ripple**

ZeroCash (ZCash)

- **ZeroCash**


- is a decentralized PTN
- that offers privacy of transactions
 - ZeroCash payments are published on a public blockchain,
 - but the sender, recipient, and amount of a transaction remain private.

- **Technology**


- DL
- Commitment Scheme
- Zero-knowledge Proof

- **We only consider a simplified version of ZeroCash due to its very high technical complexity**

Ripple – High-level Overview



ZeroCash – High-level Overview



Commitment Scheme

- **Commitment scheme**

- Secret value v
- Randomness r
- Commitment $c = \text{Com}(v;r)$

- **Security Properties**

- Data hiding
 - Cannot know v upon seeing c
- Data binding
 - Cannot find $(v'; r') \neq (v;r)$ s.t. $c = \text{com}(v';r')$

Zero-knowledge Proof

- **Zero-knowledge Proof**

- allows a Prover to convince a Verifier that a statement is true without leaking any information beyond that fact.

- **3 algorithms**

- $crs \leftarrow ZSetup(R)$
 - crs is called the Common Reference String
 - R is called the relation
 - $R(st,w) = 1$ means “ st is true”
 - st is called the statement
 - w is called the witness
- $\pi \leftarrow ZProve(crs, st, w)$
 - π is the zk-proof
- $\{0,1\} \leftarrow ZVerify(crs, st, \pi)$

A simple Commitment and ZK-Proof example

- **Commitment**

- **Prover**

- Randomly selects v and r
 - $c = \text{Com}(v;r)$
 - Sends c to the Verifier

- **Verifier**

- Receives and stores c

- **Now Prover wants to convince Verifier that c is the commitment of a value v such that $v > 0$**

- **ZK-Proof**

- **Verifier**


- $R(c,(v;r))$ means
 - $c = \text{Com}(v;r)$
 - $v > 0$
 - $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{ZSetup}(R)$
 - Sends crs to Prover
 - Receives π from Prover
 - $b \leftarrow \text{ZVerify}(\text{crs}, c, \pi)$
 - accepts π if $b = 1$

- **Prover**

- Receives crs from Verifier
 - $\pi \leftarrow \text{ZProve}(\text{crs}, c, (v;r))$
 - Sends π to Verifier


ZeroCash Transaction

- A coinbase transaction has no input coin but requires a Proof-of-Work PoW
- A regular transaction needs unspent input coins
- Output coins \leq (unspent) input coins (or PoW)




ZeroCash Transaction (2)

- PoW worths 25 coins
- A, B, C gets 10, 8, 7 coins from PoW
- D, E, F gets 5, 7, 4 coins from A and B
- I, J gets 6, 4 coins from D, E



ZeroCash – High-level Overview (2)



ZeroCash - Setup

• Brokers

- initialize an empty DL
- $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{ZSetup}(\text{R})$
 - The ZCash ceremony <https://youtu.be/D6dY-3x3teM>
 - $\text{R}(\text{st}, \text{w})$ for a transaction tk' that takes tk as input
 - $\text{st} = \text{DL}, (\text{PoW}), \text{tk}'$
 - $\text{w} = \text{tk}, \text{skp}, \text{vke}, \text{p}, \text{r}'$
 - $\text{R}(\text{st}, \text{w}) = 1$ requires
 - » tk is in DL and tk' 's output coins are unspent
 - » skp is the signing key that is required to spend tk' 's output coins
 - » $\text{p} \leq \text{tk}'$'s output coins value
 - » $\text{tk}' = \text{Com}((\text{tk}, \text{skp}, \text{vke}, \text{p}); \text{r}')$
 - requires PoW in st in case of coinbase transactions
 - » $\text{p} \leq \text{PoW}'$'s value
 - » ...
 - broadcast the crs

• Payer/Payee

- Store the crs

ZeroCash – Coinbase Transaction

- **Payer**

- Out-of-band finds the PoW
- $(vk_p, sk_p) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
- Creates a coinbase transaction
 - Supposed a PoW worths v coins
 - $ct = (\text{PoW}, vk_p, v)$
- Commits to ct
 - $tk = \text{Com}(ct;r)$
- $\pi \leftarrow \text{ZProve}(crs, (DL, tk, \text{PoW}), (vk_p, v; r))$
- Sends PoW, tk and π to Brokers

- **Brokers**

- Receives PoW, tk and π from Prover
- $b \leftarrow \text{ZVerify}(crs, (DL, tk, \text{PoW}), \pi)$
- accepts π if $b = 1$ and add (tk, π) into DL



ZeroCash – Regular Transaction

- **Payee**
 - $(vk_e, sk_e) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
 - Sends vk_e and amount p to Payer
 - Supposed $p = v$
- **Payer**
 - Receives vk_e and p from Payee
 - Creates a regular transaction
 - $t = (tk, sk_p, vk_e, p)$
 - Commits to t
 - $tk' = \text{Com}(t; r')$
 - $\pi' \leftarrow \text{ZProve}(\text{crs}, (\text{DL}, tk'), (tk, sk_p, vk_e, p; r'))$
 - Sends tk' and π' to Brokers
- **Brokers**
 - Receives tk' and π' from Prover
 - $b \leftarrow \text{ZVerify}(\text{crs}, (\text{DL}, tk'), \pi)$
 - accepts π if $b = 1$ and add (tk', π') into DL

ZeroCash – Coinbase Transaction

- Confidentiality and Anonymity

• Payer

- Out-of-band finds the PoW
- $(vk_p, sk_p) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
- Creates a coinbase transaction
 - Supposed a PoW worths v coins
 - $ct = (\text{PoW}, vk_p, v)$
- Commits to ct
 - $tk = \text{Com}(ct;r)$
- $\pi \leftarrow \text{ZProve}(crs, (DL, tk, \text{PoW}), (vk_p, v; r))$
- Sends PoW, tk and π to Brokers

Brokers only see tk but not ct

• Brokers

- Receives PoW, tk and π from Prover
- $b \leftarrow \text{ZVerify}(crs, (DL, tk, \text{PoW}), \pi)$
- accepts π if $b = 1$ and add (tk, π) into DL

ZeroCash – Regular Transaction

- Confidentiality and Anonymity

- **Payee**
 - $(vk_e, sk_e) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$
 - Sends vk_e and amount p to Payer
 - Supposed $p = v$
- **Payer**
 - Receives vk_e and p from Payee
 - Creates a regular transaction
 - $t = (tk, sk_p, vk_e, p)$
 - **Commits to t**
 - $tk' = \text{Com}(t; r')$
 - $\pi' \leftarrow \text{ZProve}(\text{crs}, (\text{DL}, tk'), (tk, sk_p, vk_e, p; r'))$
 - Sends tk' and π' to Brokers
- **Brokers**
 - Receives tk' and π' from Prover
 - $b \leftarrow \text{ZVerify}(\text{crs}, (\text{DL}, tk'), \pi)$
 - accepts π if $b = 1$ and add (tk', π') into DL

Brokers only see tk' but not tk
and t

Confidentiality vs Anonymity

- **Instantaneous Network**

- At time t , can we identify the total value v of a nominal identity I ? **NO**

- **Transient Value**

- At time t , can we know about a transaction of value v between two nominal identities I_1 and I_2 ? **NO**

- **Persistent Identity**

- Can we link two nominal identities I_1 at time t and I_2 at time t' ? **NO**

Suggested Readings

- **PTN survey**

- Massacci, Fabio, Chan-Nam Ngo, and Julian M. Williams. "Decentralized Financial Intermediation Beyond Blockchains." (2018).

- **Ripple**

- <https://developers.ripple.com/trust-lines-and-issuing.html>
- <https://developers.ripple.com/paths.html>
- <https://developers.ripple.com/transaction-basics.html>
- <https://developers.ripple.com/intro-to-consensus.html>
- Schwartz, David, Noah Youngs, and Arthur Britto. "The Ripple protocol consensus algorithm." *Ripple Labs Inc White Paper 5* (2014).

- **ZeroCash**

- <https://z.cash/technology/index.html>
- Sasson, Eli Ben, et al. "Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin." *2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 2014.