



**Cyber  
Security  
for Europe**

—

# Using statistical model checking for cybersecurity analysis

**Carlos E. Budde**

Ass. Prof. @ Università di Trento

CS4E: Cybersecurity Skills and Capability Building

---

# Modern cybersecurity: nowhere to run

## Hack Brief: Hackers Stole \$40 Million from Binance Cryptocurrency Exchange

One of the biggest cryptocurrency exchanges got hit, as thieves nabbed \$40 million of bitcoin —along with two-factor user codes and API tokens.



"The hackers used a variety of techniques, including phishing, viruses and other attacks," Binance CEO Zhao Changpeng wrote in a blog post. [AKID: K0N/BLD0M6ERG/GETTY IMAGES](#)

# Modern cybersecurity: nowhere to run

## Hack Brief: Hackers Stole \$40 Million from Binance Cryptocurrency Exchange

One of the biggest cryptocurrency exchanges got hit, as thieves nabbed \$40 million of bitcoin —along with two-factor user codes and API tokens.



"The hackers used a variety of techniques, including phishing, viruses and other attacks," Binance CEO Zhao Changpeng wrote in a blog post. [AKID: K0N/BL3D#BERG/GETTY IMAGES](#)

... but security is not Boolean,  
there is a degree of resilience to cyberattacks

## Technical Leverage in a Software Ecosystem: Development Opportunities and Security Risks

Fabio Massacci  
University of Trento (IT), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)  
fabio.massacci@ieec.org

Ivan Pashchenko  
University of Trento (IT)  
ivan.pashchenko@unitn.it

*Abstract*—In finance, *leverage* is the ratio between assets borrowed from others and one's own assets. A matching situation is present in software: by using free open-source software (FOSS) libraries a developer leverages on other people's code to multiply the offered functionalities with a much smaller own

that third party code inherited through dependencies is four times larger than the size of the own code base as an industry average [9]. It can be up to four orders of magnitude in our FOSS sample.

*Keywords*: Software development, open source, the impact of

## Measurement of Cyber Resilience from an Economic Perspective

Adam Z. Rose and Noah Miller

Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

### 10.1 Introduction

All segments of society are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber disruptions from malicious actors, natural disasters, and technological accidents. Although significant efforts are being made to protect cyber systems from threats, increasing cyber usage and increasing frequency and potential magnitude of threats appears to be more than offsetting these initiatives. There is a growing realization in the cyber area, as well as in other domains, that we cannot protect complex systems against all threats, so some attention has

# It's a matter of ~~trust~~ \$€£¥฿...



How much \$€£¥฿ covers the degree of security I want?



How much security I want/need?

# It's a matter of ~~trust~~ \$€£¥฿...



How much \$€£¥฿ covers the degree of security I want?



How much security I want/need?



How valuable am I?

How vulnerable am I?

# It's a matter of ~~trust~~ \$€£¥฿...



How much \$€£¥฿ covers the degree of security I want?




How much security I want/need?



How valuable am I?



How vulnerable am I?



# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

## An Attack Surface Metric

Pratyusa K. Manadhata

CMU-CS-08-152

November 2008

IP address and domains, SSL certificates, ports & services, etc.





# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

## An Attack Surface Metric

Pratyusa K. Manadhata

CMU-CS-08-152

November 2008

IP address and domains, SSL certificates, ports & services, etc.



MOBILE TECH T-MOBILE

## Another T-Mobile cyberattack reportedly exposed customer info and SIMs

*Documents say the company has contacted impacted customers*

By Mitchell Clark

Dec 28, 2021, 6:30pm EST

Dec 28, 2021, 6:30pm EST

# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

Metrics from known exploits are hard to extrapolate in time

# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

Metrics from known exploits are hard to extrapolate in time

How vulnerable am I? → shall I be?

# Measuring SW security vulnerability

**Empirical approach:** assess existent IT framework  
e.g. known vulnerabilities in code

Metrics from known exploits are hard to extrapolate in time


How vulnerable am I? → shall I be?

**Proposal: let's model & check**

Fit attack patterns and distributions within a formal framework  
(**model checking** in formal methods)




# Model checking for safety, liveness, etc.

$$M \models \varphi$$



# Model checking for safety, liveness, etc.

$$\boxed{M} \models \varphi$$






# Model checking for safety, liveness, etc.

$$M \models \varphi$$

$\square \neg$ unsafe

$\square \diamond$ alive






# Model checking for safety, liveness, etc.

$$M \models \varphi$$

$$P(\text{unsafe}) \leq 0.02$$

$\square \neg \text{unsafe}$

$\square \diamond \text{alive}$






# Model checking for security

$$M \models \varphi$$

$$P(\text{unsafe}) \leq 0.02$$

$$P(\text{exploit}) \leq 0.02$$





# Model checking for security

$$M \models \varphi$$

$$P(\text{unsafe}) \leq 0.02$$

$$P(\text{exploit}) \leq 0.02$$





# A statistical model checker for rare events

$$M \models \varphi$$

$$P(\text{exploit}) \leq 0.02$$


Attack Trees to model exploits



# A statistical model checker for rare events

$$M \models \varphi$$



Attack Trees to model exploits



$$P(\text{exploit}) \leq 0.02$$



FIG





**Cyber  
Security  
for Europe**  
—

---

# Using statistical model checking for cybersecurity analysis

**Carlos E. Budde**


CS4E: Cybersecurity Skills and Capability Building (WP6)

<https://webapps.unitn.it/du/en/Persona/PER0235360/Curriculum>

[<carloseteban.budde@unitn.it>](mailto:carloseteban.budde@unitn.it)

---

# .bkp: FT syntax to IOSA semantics



## Kepler:

“TLE” and “A” “B”;  
 “A” fail~gamma(9,1) repair~exponential(6);  
 “B” fail~exponential(1) repair~uniform(1,2);  
 “R” rbox prio “A” “B”;

$f_A$  fail<sub>A</sub>


$r_A$  rep<sub>A</sub>

$f_B$  fail<sub>B</sub>

$r_B$  rep<sub>B</sub>

Formalise the model

## IOSA:



## Property query:

$P(\text{time} < 8 \ U \ \text{TLE})$



Formalise the query

$\varphi = \text{Prob}(A_t \wedge B_t \mid t < 8)$ ,  
 where  $A_t, B_t$  are stochastic processes with Boolean state space

## CTMC:

