





Research ideas

Attacker economics for Internet-Scale risk Assessment

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Research objectives

- I aim at enabling decision makers in making statements like:
 - "If we fix vulnerabilities in this group, the risk of cyber attacks against our costumers will decrease by 55%"
 - Risk is not measured by

$$\frac{\sum_{v \in machines} CVSS(vu \ln)}{\sum_{machine}} - \int firewalls \pm ...$$

- Focus on un-targeted attacks against the general population
 - Google: 80% of risk comes from these attacks







Research Plan

Three tracks:

- Characteristics of (non)interesting vulnerabilities (CVSS-based)
- Context characteristics for interesting vulnerabilities
- Trends in attacks enabled by attack tools



Track1: Characteristics of





(non)interesting vulns

- CVSS is a composition of expert judgments on vulnerability characteristics
- Some combinations may be good indicators for "likelihood of exploitation"
 - E.g. High complexity, low-medium Impact
 vulnerabilities → not interesting for exploitation
- Differentely, the final CVSS score may not correlate with (non)exploitation
- Empirical research: need the data







Empirical research


- Datasets
 - NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE: NVD
 - The universe of vulnerabilities
 - WHITE MARKETS OF EXPLOITS: EXPLOIT-DB
 - Proof-of-Concept exploits published by security researchers
 - ACTUAL EXPLOITS IN THE WILD: SYM
 - Symantec / Kaspersky Threat reports
 - Vulnerabilities actually exploited in the wild
 - RECORD OF ATTACK IN THE WILD WORLDWIDE: WINE
 - BLACK MARKETS FOR EXPLOITS: EKITS
 - Exploit advert from the bad guys in an exploit kit
 - 90+ exploit kits from the black markets
- Usage: economic modeling of exploitation, correlation market cost/popularity in the wild, controlled experiments, testing of blackhat tools, ..



What vulnerabilities do attackers exploit?









Is CVSS a good marker for exploitation?





- Sensitivity → true positives vs all attacked vulns
 - HIGH → the test correctly identifies exploited vulns
 - LOW → lots of exploits undetected
- Specificity

 true negatives vs all non-attacked vulns
 - HIGH → the test correctly identifies non exploited vulns
 - LOW → lots of non-exploited vulns flagged


Test for Patching	Sensitivity	Specificity
CVSS High+Med	91%	23%
CVSS + PoC in EDB	97%	22%
CVSS + EKITS	94%	50%
3BT: Down Syndrome	69%	95%










Why CVSS does not work?









- Risk (CVSS)= Impact x Likelihood
 - CVSS Likelihood = Exploitability
- Everything is exploitable →
 CVSS lacks of a real characterization of likelihood of exploitation

Track2: Context variables for





exploitation

- Look at the exploitation from an Expected Utility perspective
 - Among a set of vulnerabilities v₁...v_j
 - High risk = max(EU(v_1), EU(v_2)..., EU(v_i))
- Example hypotheses
- If other exploits exists for that software, other vulns represent lower risk
- Among a set of vulnerabilities, the attacker is most likely to attack that with highest pay-off
- 3. Persistence of the vulnerability in time
- ..Will keep you posted



Track3: Trends in attacks enabled by attacker tools





- Black markets trade tools to perform automated attacks
- Collaboration with symantec WINE Project
- Correlation with data in EKITS from the black markets
- assessment of black market trends for final user security







Questions?

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Track3: Trends in attacks enabled by attacker tools

Blackhole

